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Colorado has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, effective
July 1, 1966.1 It is the purpose of this article to review briefly the
mechanics of perfecting a security interest under the Code and to
discuss in detail the application of specific Code provisions to oil
and gas financing.2 Particular emphasis will be placed upon filing
and priority problems in Colorado.3
In general, Article 9 of the Code is intended to replace the
various acts which previously regulated security interest in personal
property.' In the interest of uniformity, Article 9 includes rules for
the perfection of practically every type of consensual security interest
in personal property but does not cover security interest in real
estate,5 except insofar as "fixtures" are involved.' This realty-
personalty distinction is particularly crucial in oil and gas financing.
If a security interest in real estate is involved, real estate recording
laws are applicable. If a security interest in personal property is
*Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; member Colorado Bar; B.A.
Amherst College, 1962; LL.B. Harvard University, 1965.
tAssociate, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; member Colorado Bar; B.B.A.
University of Wisconsin, 1962; LL.B. University of Wisconsin, 1964.
'Colo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 330; Vol. 7A, COLO. REV. STAT. (1963) ch. 155. For
convenience, subsequent references will be made to Uniform Code sections only.
2 Discussion of financing problems which may be unique to shale oil is beyond the scope
of this article. For a general treatment of oil shale matters unrelated to finance see the
Oil Shale Symposium 43 DEN. L.J. 1-90 (1966).
3 For a general discussion of the Code as it relates to oil and gas financing, see Vagts,
The Impact of The Uniform Commercial Code on the Oil and Gas Mortgage, 43
TEXAS L. REV. 825 (1965).
4 General Chattel Mortgage Act [COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-1 to -20 (1963)] ; Inven-
tory Chattel Mortgage Statute [COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2-1 to -13 (1963)] ; Accounts




involved, Article 9 of the Code is applicable and the Code "security
agreement" and "financing statement" come into play.7 If the
collateral changes from realty to personalty, as may occur at the
moment of extraction of oil and gas,' then both bodies of security
law apply at different times. The realty-personalty distinction as it
applies to oil and gas interests in Colorado is discussed in Part I
of this article.
At this point, a brief review of the mechanics of Article 9 will
provide a useful background for the discussion to follow. The key
to Article 9 is "perfection"; that is, Article 9 is designed to regulate
uniformly the perfection of various types of security interests in
personalty as against third parties. Adoption of the Code eliminates
existing inconsistencies arising from perfection of various security
interests in the same collateral pursuant to separate statutory pro-
visions. In general, Article 9 provides that a security interest is
perfected when:
(a) there is an agreement that a security interest attach;' and
(b) value is given;" and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral; 11 and
(d) a financing statement is filed.'
Some exceptions are made for perfection by possession, "3 and
certain types of purchase money security interests are exempted
from the filing requirement." The above rules of perfection are
7 Section 9-102(1) (a).
8 Section 9-204(2) (b). See, e.g., Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399
(1897).




12 Section 9-302 (1). The contents of the financing statement are prescribed by § 9-402.
It must give the addresses of the debtor and the secured party and must, with few
exceptions, be signed by both parties. A copy of the security agreement may be filed
as a financing statement if it contains the requisite information, but care should be
taken to assure that the secured party has signed the instrument in addition to the
debtor.
Special attention should be given to the provision of § 9-402 (1), which requires
that both parties "sign" a financing statement. A few liberal courts have held that the
signature requirement was satisfied where a party "signed" in some manner other
than manually. [See In re Horvath Bankruptcy No. 31477 (D. Conn. 1963) and
Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F. 2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965) (typewritten signatures suffi-
cient) ; contra, In re Kane, 55 Berks Co. L.J. (E.D. Pa. 1962) (photostatic copy of
executed financing statement insufficient).] However, Colorado has added to that
section a requirement that a financing statement be manually signed by the parties.
Although this special provision clearly indicates that typewritten signatures or photo-
static copies of executed financing statements will not suffice for filing in Colorado,
the question remains whether a carbon copy of a manual signature will meet the statu-
tory requirernent. [See Op. AwnT. GEN. OKLA., No. 63-299 (1963), i U.C.C. Rep.
790.]
13 Section 9-305.
14 Sections 9-302(1 ) (c) and (d).
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generally applicable to oil and gas financing transactions, except as
noted in specific instances in the text discussion which follows.
A financing statement may cover both the extracted hydro-
carbons and the proceeds thereof.15 It is only necessary that the
financing statement designate that proceeds of the collateral are
claimed. It should be noted that under Section 9-307(1) a pur-
chaser of extracted hydrocarbons in the ordinary course of business
will take free of a security interest in the hydrocarbons even though
the purchaser knows of the existence of the security interest." This
provision is consistent with the need for marketability of the ex-
tracted hydrocarbons and does not adversely affect the secured party's
interest in the proceeds of production.
Attention should also be given to Section 9-203(1) (b) which
requires that a security agreement creating a security interest in oil
or gas to be extracted include a description of the land concerned.
Although no similar requirement is made as to a financing statement
covering oil and gas to be extracted, it is suggested that the legal
description of the land should also be included in the financing
statement to satisfy Section 9-110, which requires reasonably accurate
identification of the property covered by the statement.
As a practical matter, one of the primary advantages of code
filing as to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds is that it relieves
the lender from dual filing under present chattel mortgage and
accounts receivable statutes and greatly reduces periodic refiling
presently required by those statutes. The five year initial filing period
and five year continuation periods" will be much less burdensome
to the lender than the considerably shorter initial filing periods and
annual renewals presently required for chattel mortgages and assign-
ments of accounts receivable in Colorado."
The place for filing required by the Code is contingent upon
classification of the collateral. Basically, all types of Code collateral
involved in an oil and gas financing context would be goods19 (which
are further subclassified by Section 9-109 into four categories: con-
15 Sections 9-306, 9-402(2) (b).
16 Under the pre-Code Inventory Mortgage Act, a question existed whether extracted
hydrocarbons awaiting sale and delivery in the ordinary course to a purchaser consti-
tuted "inventory." If they were considered "inventory," an opposite result would
attach under the Act and a purchaser who had actual knowledge of the existence of a
security interest could not take free of that interest. Since it is the intention of the
parties that the security interest continue only in the proceeds of the sale of goods in
the ordinary course of business, few lenders will mourn the repeal of this provision
by enactment of the Code. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2-7 (1963).
17 Section 9-403(2) (3).




sumer goods, equipment, farm products, and inventory); accounts,
contract rights or general intangibles;" and proceeds. 1 Various types
of production machinery and equipment used in oil and gas opera-
tions may be classified as "equipment."' Extracted hydrocarbons
awaiting delivery to a purchaser would probably be classified as
"inventory."' The filing provisions adopted in Colorado provide
for (i) local filing for consumer goods and farm interests, (ii) local
filing for fixtures, and (iii) central filing for all other interests.'
Thus, central filing in the office of the Secretary of State would be
proper as to all oil and gas financing transactions involving per-
sonalty in Colorado, except where local filing may be necessary
with respect to fixtures included in the mortgaged property. Certain
filing problems pertaining to fixtures are discussed in Part IX of
this article.
I. OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
PERSONAL PROPERTY OR INTERESTS
IN REAL ESTATE?
The vital question under the Code is whether various oil and
gas interests - landowners' mineral and royalty interests, leasehold
estates, overriding royalties, production payments and net profits
interests - are personal property or interests in real estate. Section
9-104(j) provides that Article 9 does not apply "to the creation or
transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease."
Presumably, this exclusionary rule is necessary to prevent conflict
between the real estate recording laws and the filing provisions of
the Code. Although direct case authority in Colorado is scanty, it
may be generally concluded that all of the above-mentioned oil and
gas interests, with the possible exception of the net profits interest,
are "interests in real estate" for recording purposes and thus ex-
cluded from the filing provisions of Article 9.
The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that the landowner's
mineral estate is "an interest in the real property''25 and that his roy-
alty interest under a lease is "born of and is a part of the land itself."'





24Sections 9-401(1)(a), (b), and (c).
25 Simson v. Langholf, 133 Colo. 208, 217, 293 P.2d 302, 307 (1956). Sce also, Moshiek
v. Lininger, 130 Colo. 266, 274 P.2d 965 (1954).
2 6
Cruse v. Marston, 112 Colo. 291, 294, 148 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1944) (royalty income
to Colorado resident from Texas oil lands held to be derived from tangible property
within the meaning of a surtax provision of the Colorado income tax law).
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the lessee's interest and interests created from it, the majority rule,"
and the general opinion of the Colorado Bar, is that such are "inter-
ests in real estate"' for mortgage recording purposes.'
An argument to exclude oil and gas leasehold interests from
the operation of the Code may be derived from the portion of Sec-
tion 9-104(j) which speaks of "real estate, including a lease." One
construction of this provision is that "lease" includes a mineral
lease, and that an oil and gas leasehold is an interest in real estate
for Code purposes regardless of its characterization under prior
state law. If this construction is sound, it follows that the Code
expressly overrides any state law which suggests that a leasehold
interest may be something other than realty. This interpretation,
however, overlooks the underlying policy of Section 9-104 (j), which
is to defer to state law for a determination between interests in realty
and personalty. The preferable construction, therefore, is that a lease
is excluded from the rules of Article 9 only if it constitutes, under
state decisional law, "an interest in real estate."
A more persuasive argument to exclude oil and gas leaseholds
27 Representative jurisdictions applying the majority rule are Oklahoma [Continental Sup-
ply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803
(1946)]; Texas [Carroll v. Holliman, 336 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1964)] ; and Cali-
fornia [Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935)].
In New York, an oil and gas leasehold and interests carved out of it constitute
personalty, by statute. N.Y., General Construction Law, § 39; Wagner v. Mallory,
169 N.Y. 501, 62 N.E. 584 (1902).
Kansas appears to be the only state which holds, in the absence of a clear statutory
provision, that an oil and gas leasehold is personalty for recording purposes. Shields
v. Fink, 190 Kan. 17, 372 P.2d 252 (1962). Kansas has enacted the Code effective
January 1, 1966. Thus, a Colorado bank financing development of a Kansas lease
must file under the Code as to the leasehold itself. Real estate recording would pro-
vide additional protection in Kansas. See KAN. STAT. ANNO. 58-2221 (1963).
28 Use of the phrase "interest in real estate" may lead to confusion in interpretation of
§ 9-104(j). This confusion stems from the fact that according to traditional property
law interests in land may be classified as either personal property or real property.
All interests in land of lesser dignity than a freehold estate, such as a term for years,
are traditionally regarded as chattels real; that is, personal property interests in land.
POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 98 (1949). Thus, a question is presented whether the
Code draftsmen intended by § 9-104(j) to exclude from operation of Article 9 all
interests in real estate, whether traditionally regarded as realty or personalty. This
formalistic distinction is particularly important in states such as Colorado, which have
not yet ruled that the lessee obtains ownership of the oil and gas in place. Contra, see
Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 '(1923).
If the language of § 9-104(j) is literally interpreted, there is no question that an oil
and gas leasehold estate and other interests created from it are interests in real estate
excluded from the operation of Article 9, since that section does not differentiate as to
chattels real. For a general discussion of the realty-personalty classification of interests
in land see 1 WILLIAMS & MEYER., OIL AND GAS LAW, § 212 (1964). Moreover, in
Radke v. Union Pac. R.R., 138 Colo. 189, 207, 334 P.2d 1077, 1087 (1959) the court,
in construing an ambiguous mineral reservation in a deed as a "license," added by way
of dictum: "Under a lease an interest-or estate-in the land itself is created, which
is not true of a mere license." (Emphasis added.)
29 There is no question that an oil and gas lease is an instrument affecting the title to
real property, subject to the Colorado real estate recording statute. COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 118-6-9 (1963). See Brice v. Pugh, 143 Colo. 508, 354 P.2d 1024 (1960). It seems




from operation of the Code can be fashioned from Section 9-204(2)
(b), which provides that "the debtor has no rights ... in oil, gas, or
minerals until they are extracted." This provision seems clearly in-
tended to keep under the real estate recording laws any type of
security interest relating to unextracted hydrocarbons.
The weight of authority in other jurisdictions and the treatment
of a landowner's interest in unextracted oil and gas as realty in
Colorado, lead to the conclusion that an oil and gas leasehold estate
and the interests created from it constitute "interests in real estate"
within the meaning of Section 9-104 (j) 30
Assuming that the oil and gas leasehold is "an interest in real
estate" exempted from Code filing, it would seem to follow that
other interests created from the leasehold estate, such as overriding
royalty interests and production payments, are similarly exempted. The
one interest, however, which may partake more of the qualities of
personalty, is the "net profits interest."'" There is some indication
from the cases, at least by way of dictum, that a net profits interest is
a mere contract light. 2 Under such a classification, a mortgage of a
30 There is authority in Colorado that an oil and gas lessee does not obtain a "vested"
property interest in the hydrocarbons in place until hydrocarbons are produced from
the leasehold in paying quantities. In other words, the lessee's interest in Colorado
may be "inchoate" until the hydrocarbons are discovered on the leasehold in paying
quantities. See generally, March, The Interest of Landowner and Lessee in Oil and Gas
in Colorado, 25 ROCKy MT. L. REV. 117 (1953). Several older Colorado decisions
hold that long-term, or "no term" leases with delay rental provisions, may be termin-
able by the lessor if the lessee fails to develop the premises for oil and gas
within a certain period of time. Florence Oil & Ref. Co. v. Orman, 19 Colo. App. 79,
73 Pac. 628 (1903) ; Lanham v. Jones, 84 Colo. 129, 268 Pac. 521 (1928). These
authorities suggest that the lessee has an interest in the nature of a revocable license
rather than a vested property interest in the unextracted minerals. The general rule,
by contrast, seems to be that a lessee's interest is fully vested upon execution of the
lease. See, e.g., Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918). Where the
parties expressly contract for payment of delay rentals to perpetuate the leasehold
estate during the primary term prior to drilling or production, the lessor does not, of
course, have the right to revoke the lease if rentals have been timely paid. Although
the Colorado Supreme Court has not yet passed on the nature of the lessee's interest
under a modern "unless" form of oil and gas lease, it is possible that prior authority will
lead the court to perpetuate the "revocable license doctrine," which conditions vested
ownership in the lessee upon a discovery of hydrocarbons in paying quantities.
However, none of these older Colorado cases suggests that the lessee's interest,
whether or not inchoate prior to discovery, is not "an interest in real estate." There-
fore, they should not alter the conclusion that the real estate recording laws are appli-
cable to a mortgage of an oil and gas leasehold interest, and that the filing rules of
Article 9 are applicable only as to extracted hydrcarbons. But, see Hoagland, A Form
of Mortgage and Assignment of Oil and Gas Production, 34 DICTA 226 (1957),
where it is stated that Colorado is "in mid-air" as to whether a lessee's interest and
related interests are "interests in land."
31 The net profits interest is a share of gross production from a producing property,
measured by the net profits from operation of the property. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW, § 424.1 (1964).
3 In LeBus v. LeBus, 269 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), there was an alleged oral
agreement that, in consideration for services in acquiring a leasehold for X, Y would
be entitled to one-fourth of the net profits, if any, resulting from operation of the
lease. The court stated that this transaction created a mere contractual right to have a
share of the profits paid over when earned-"a profit-sharing agreeirent"-rather
than a vested partnership interest in the realty. Contra, Greenleaf v. S. A. Camp Gin-
ning Co., 150 Cal. App. 385, 309 P.2d 943 (1957).
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net profits interest would presumably constitute a security interest in
a "contract right" within the meaning of Section 9-106, and Code
filing would be necessary to protect the mortgagee. 3 Despite the
contractual quality of the net profits interest, it is submitted that it
should also be treated as an "interest in real estate" for purposes of
the recording statutes.34 However, for complete protection, real estate
recording and Code filing should be accomplished where a net profits
interest is included as part of the collateral.36
This article will proceed on the assumption that an oil and
gas leasehold estate and other interests fashioned from it are "in-
terests in real estate" and are not subject to the filing requirements
of Article 9.
Despite the classification difficulties as to interests in un-
extracted hydrocarbons, it is clear under the Code that the extracted
hydrocarbons become personalty subject to the rules of Article 9.36
In addition, the general rules of Article 9 are applicable to the
various types of equipment and machinery used in oil and gas opera-
tions, insofar as such machinery and equipment remain personalty
under the decisional law of Colorado. If goods become fixtures, Sec-
tion 9-313 provides special rules for ascertaining the priority of
conflicting security interests in the fixtures and the real estate.
In many respects, financing of the oil and gas industry involves
considerations common to other industries. For example, the use of
after acquired property clauses and future advance provisions is as
commonplace in the oil and gas mortgage as in the mortgage of an
automobile dealer's inventory. 7 However, the types of collateral
covered by an oil and gas mortgage may present special problems
under Article 9 which are not usually encountered in other areas of
finance. Although implimentation of the Code will eliminate certain
inconsistencies in present law, the broad base of Article 9 will
inevitably provide a breeding ground for new problems to replace
33 Section 9-103 provides that filing as to contract rights must be made in the state where
the assignor keeps his records concerning them.
34 For a strong opinion to this effect, see 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 31,
§ 424.1.
35 Careful draftsmanship may also help to detract from the contract right theory. A net
profits interest created and conveyed as an interest in real estate measured by profits
derived from operation of the property would be less susceptible to interpretation as
a mere contractual interest.
36 Section 9-204(2) (b). See also, 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 31, § 212.
37 See generally, Voorhees, Financing Oil and Gas Operations on Credit-Mortgages
and Liens, FIFTH ANNUAL ROcKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 365 (1960) ;
Johnson, Legal Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF OIL
AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 141 (1958).
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the old. The remainder of this article will explore some of these
problem areas unique to oil and gas financing under the Code.38
II. FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
Personal property security interests in federal oil and gas leases
seem at first glance to present a special problem. Section 9-302(3)
states that "The filing provisions [of Article 9J do not apply to a
security interest in property subject to a statute ... (a) of the United
States which provides for . . . filing of all security interests in such
property." (Emphasis added.) Under the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920"9 and the regulations issued pursuant thereto, it is provided
that:
Except for assignments of royalty interests all instruments of trans-
fer of a lease or of an interest therein... must be filled for approval
within 90 days from the date of final execution .... 40
Although the regulation appears to be phrased broadly enough
38The most immediate practical problem for oil and gas financers, as well as for other
lenders, will be the problem of transition to the new law when it becomes effective
July 1, 1966. Oil and gas financing arrangements are usually long-term affairs in-
volving after-acquired property, future advances and renewal filings. What happens
to pre-Code loans when the new law comes into effect? Must lenders file anew when
the Code becomes law? May pre-Code transactions be brought under the Code if
the parties desire to do so? Where are post-Code renewal filings made? Will refiling
under the Code bring with it all the substantive law of Article 9, which is generally
more advantageous to the lender than the old law?
Section 10-101 of the Code attempts to answer these questions by providing that:
Transactions validly entered into prior to the effective date ... and the rights,
duties, and interests flowing from them remain valid thereafter and may be
terminated, completed, consummated, or enforced as required or permitted
[by prior law].
Although this provision presents problems too numerous for discussion in this article,
the following may be stated as a series of general conclusions: a bank financing a pre-
Code oil and gas loan may keep the old filings alive and file status statements under
the pre-Code statutes, even after the Code becomes effective. The substantive law of
the repealed statutes will in every way continue to control pre-Code loans until a new,
post-Code "transaction" is created by reexecution of the instrument securing the loan,
or until the parties enter a choice-of-law contract binding them to the substantive law
of the Code and to its filing requirements. See Clark, U.C.C. Articles 9 and 10: Some
Problems Solved and Some Problems Created, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 99 (1965). For
difficulties raised in connection with transition to the Code in other states, see Janover
and Dulles, The Application of the Transistion Provisions of Uniform Commercial
Code Article 10 to Chattel Security Filing, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1027 (1964) ; Auerbach
& Goldston, Variations in the Ohio Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,
14 W. REs. L. REV. 22, 51 (1962).
39 41 Stat. 437 (1920) ; as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 181-94 (1964).
40 43 C.F.R. § 3128.2(a) (1) (1965). In addition, certain procedural benefits are de-
rived from filing a mortgage in the Land Office. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-6(d) (1965) and
43 C.F.R. § 1850.0-6(d) '(1965) provide:
Transferees and encumbrancers of land, the title to which is claimed or
is in the process of acquisition under any public land law shall, upon filing
notice of the transfer or encumbrance in the proper land office, become en-
titled to receive and be given the same notice of any contest appeal, or other
proceeding thereafter initiated affecting such interest which is required to
be given to a party to the proceeding. Every such notice of a transfer or en-
cumbrance will be noted upon the records of the land office. Thereafter such
transferee or encumbrancer must be made a party to any proceedings thereafter
initiated adverse to the entry.
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to include mortgages within its terms, a memorandum 1 from regional
counsel of the Department of the Interior has implied that approval
of a mortgage of a federal lease is not required. Thus, mortgages
are commonly accepted by Land Offices for filing in the case files
without the necessity of approval. This, in turn, raises a question
whether the Mineral Leasing Act "provides for ... filing of all
security interests" in federal oil and gas leases and thereby excludes
filing under Article 9.
Although parties who search the Land Office records may
obtain actual notice of instruments on file, a troublesome question
exists whether the records are also sufficient to impart constructive
notice. With this problem in mind, most attorneys advise that a
mortgage of an interest in a federal lease be recorded in the county,
as well as filed in the Land Office. Such dual filing protects the
mortgagee from the uncertainties which stem from the fact that
the Mineral Leasing Act is not a federal recording statute. Failure
to record in the county has in some cases led to loss of priority as
against subsequent purchasers of an interest in the federal lease."2
However, the opposite result has also been reached by theory of
"implied actual notice" or "judicial notice." 3
The answer to this problem may be found, in part, in the
Official Comment to Section 9-302(3), which refers to specific
federal recording statutes which preempt the field, as for mortgages
on aircraft" or railroads. 5 At present, the Mineral Leasing Act and
regulations lack the specificity of the federal recording statutes cited
in the Official Comment. Thus, it is likely that filing under Article 9
will be required, in addition to Land Office filing, where chattel
security interests in federal oil and gas leases are involved. In light
of the more recent cases dealing with the Land Office record notice
problem, 8 the prudent lender would be well advised to accomplish
dual filing until the problem is resolved by legislative action. How-
ever, if a mandatory federal recording statute is added to the Mineral
41Memorandum to Regional Administrator, Region VI, GS-BLM-1953-100 (July 14,
1953).
42 Bolack v. Underwood, 340 F2d 816 (10th Cir 1965); Torgeson v. Connelly, 318 P 2d
63 (Wyo. 1959); Dame v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959).
43Krueger v. United States, 246 U.S. 69 (1918); Brush v. Ware, 40 U.S. (15 Peters)
93 (1841); South v. Wishard, 146 Cal. App. 2d 276, 303 P.2d 805 (1956) ; Arnold
v. Universal Oil Land Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 522, 114 P.2d 408 (1941) ; Livermore v.
Beal, 18 Cal. App. 2d 535, 64 P.2d 987, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 712 (1937) ; Gabbs
Exploration Co., 67 Interior Dec. 160 (1960) ; James C. Forsling, 56 Interior Dec.
281 (1938).
63 Stat. 940 (1949), 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
66 Stat. 724 (1952), 49 U.S.C. § 20(c) (1964).
46 See cases cited note 42 supra.
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Leasing Act,47 the Code would become clearly inapplicable to per-
fection of security interests in federal oil and gas leases.48
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS
One of the more important changes which will occur upon
implimentation of the Code in Colorado pertains to a mortgage by a
corporate debtor which covers both realty and personalty. Such
a "mixed mortgage" is commonplace in oil and gas financing. The
General Chattel Mortgage Act presently provides that if the mixed
mortgage is recorded in the real estate records of the appropriate
county, it shall also be a lien against the mortgaged personalty with-
out the necessity of complying with the filing provisions of the
General Chattel Mortgage Act. 49 It could be argued that filing
would nevertheless be required as to inventory and accounts re-
ceivable, which are generally controlled by the Inventory Chattel
Mortgage Statute and Accounts Receivable Law, rather than the
General Chattel Mortgage Statute. However, there is some authority
for the proposition that failure to comply with the applicable filing
provisions of the Inventory Mortgage Act and Accounts Receivable
Law will bring the transaction within the provisions of the General
Chattel Mortgage Act." Thus, under pre-Code law the lender could
be reasonably certain that a single recording pursuant to the General
Chattel Mortgage Act would suffice to cover both the realty and
the personalty of the corporate mortgagor. Enactment of the Code in
Colorado will upset this simplified scheme of perfection and require
Code filing in addition to real estate recording.
With respect to proceeds arising from the sale of extracted
4 Such an amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act was recently advocated by Senator
Gordon Allott in an address before the Association of American Petroleum Landmen
on June 25, 1965.
48 Analogous problems concern security interests in oil and gas leases issued by the
State of Colorado. Section 9-302(3) (b) exempts from the filing provisions of Article
9 security interests in property subject to a statute "[o]f this state which provides for
central filing of security interests in such property .... (Emphasis added.) Al-
though COLO. REv. STAT. § 112-3-10 (1963) provides that the records "kept by
the state board of land commissioners shall be a part of the public records of said
board and shall be open to inspection," this section does not purport to be a record-
ing statute.
49 COLO. REv. STAT. § 21-1-9 (1963). An interesting question is presented as to whether
this statute is intended to relieve the mortgagee from filing as a chattel mortgage with
respect to personalty kept in counties other than the county where the mortgaged real
estate is situated. Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 21-1-4(2) (1963). This uncertainty will
be mooted by enactment of the Code.
50 Exchange Nat'i Bank v. Hough, 258 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1958). The Hough case,
however, also suggests that compliance with the more stringent requirements of the
General Act, such as direct application of the proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness,
would be necessary if the Inventory Mortgage Act and Accounts Receivable Law were
not complied with. Id. at 789-90.
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hydrocarbons, Section 9-306(3) provides in effect that a perfected
security interest in hydrocarbons will be automatically perfected in
the proceeds thereof for ten days after the debtor receives the pro-
ceeds. The security interest will be continuously perfected if the
financing statement on file states that it covers proceeds or if a
financing statement covering proceeds is filed before expiration
of the ten day period. This ten day "grace period" for perfection
has no counterpart under the present Accounts Receivable Law.
Moreover, a security interest in proceeds, whether perfected initially
or during the ten day period, will be continuously perfected against
third parties, including a trustee in bankruptcy or a levying creditor,
as to accounts and cash proceeds identified according to the tracing
rules of Section 9-306(4).
A more subtle problem may be encountered under Code law
concerning express subordination agreements. The Code authorizes
"subordination by agreement by any person entitled to priority."'-
Contractual subordination of competing security interests has been,
and will continue to be, an important tool in oil and gas financing.
As has sometimes been the practice, subordination agreements have
not been placed of record. However, under the Code a serious ques-
tion exists whether a subordination agreement constitutes a 'security
interest" and is subject to the filing rules of Article 9.52 Until this
question is resolved, parties to a subordination asreement would be
well advised to file under the Code if practicable.
IV. EQUIPMENT AND MOTOR VEHICLE:S
"Equipment" is defined in Section 9-109(2) as goods used or
bought for use in business. Rigs, pumps, drilling apparatus and
other machinery used upon the oil and gas leasehold would pre-
sumably fall under this definition.53 Often equipment used in lease-
hold operations is motorized or attached to motor vehicles. For ex-
ample, some types of modern drilling rigs are self-propelled vehiclCs.
The Code,' read in connection with the Colorado Certificate of Title
5' Section 9-316.
52 See Zinman, Under the Spreading U.C.C.-Subordinations and Article 9. 7 B.C. IND. &
COMM. L. REv. 1 (1965). Coogan, Kripke and Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9:
Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Aloney and Deposits, Negative Pledge
Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HARV. L. REv. 229 (1965).
53 "Consumer goods" are defined in § 9-109(1) as goods "used or bought for use pri-
marily for personal, family, or household purposes." Because oil and gas equipment
does not ordinarily constitute consumer goods, there need be no itemization of the
equipment to make the description sufficient in the financing statement, as is other-
wise required by § 9.110.
54 Sections 9-302(3)'(b) and (4).
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Act,"5 provides that Article 9 does not cover the perfection of security
interests in "motor vehicles." Section 9-302(4) states:
The filing provisions of this article do not apply to a security
interest in property subject to a statute ... [o]f this State which
provides for a central filing of security interests in... a motor
vehicle which is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate
of title is required under the statutes of this state, if a notation of
such security interest can be indicated by a public official on a
certificate or duplicate thereof .. . .A security interest in property
covered by a statute described in subsection (3) of this section
can be perfected only by... indication of the security interest on a
certificate of title .... (Emphasis added.)
The Certificate of Title Act fits squarely into this Code scheme
by providing, in section 13-6-19, that chattel mortgage filing "shall
not.., apply to the mortgaging of motor vehicles." Section 13-6-19
requires that an encumbrance upon a motor vehicle, to be valid
against third parties, "shall be filed for public record and the fact
thereof noted on the owner's certificate of title .. " In other words,
where oil and gas equipment includes "motor vehicles," Article 9
filing is inadequate; only certificate of title notation protects the
lien. In all other respect (i.e., rights on default, priorities, etc.),
Article 9 still applies."
Although it seems clear that a self propelled drilling rig would
be a "motor vehicle," questions may arise whether other types of oil
and gas equipment attached to a motor vehicle become part of the
vehicle for filing purposes. The Certificate of Title Act is not help-
ful in its definition of motor vehicle as "all vehicles propelled by
power, other than muscle power .... ."" However, the Colorado
Supreme Court has ruled that a purchase money security interest in
tires affixed to a motor vehicle is not subordinate to a prior mortgage
with an after-acquired property clause which encumbers the vehicle.
The court reasoned that the tires were subsequently added to the
vehicle as an accessory, were readily detachable, and thus were not
"merged" into the "motor vehicle.'' s" The same rationale could apply
to oil and gas equipment subsequently attached to a motor vehicle
covered by a prior mortgage. If, however, equipment were attached
to a vehicle prior to execution of a security agreement covering the
equipment, a court might conclude that the equipment had become
part of the "motor vehicle" and subject to the Certificate of Title
55 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-6-1 to -43 (1963). The statute excludes from the definition
of motor vehicle "industrial machinery not designed primarily for highway trans-
portation." This exclusion is not, however, helpful with respect to equipment
attached to motor vehicles which are subject to the Certificate of Title Act.
56 See Kapral v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 52 Luz. Leg. Reg. 276 (Ct. C. P., Pa., 1962).
5 7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-2(2) (1963).
58 Rabtoay Gen. Tire Co. v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 135 Colo. 110, 120, 309 P.2d 616,
621 (1957).
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Act. If so, a security interest in the equipment could only be perfected
by compliance with the Certificate of Title Act, and Article 9 would
be inapplicable. Where this uncertainty is present the oil and gas
mortgagee should obtain complete protection by filing under the
Code as to all "equipment" and complying with the Certificate of
Title Act as to any equipment which is motorized or attached to
motor vehicles."
V. ACCOUNTS, CONTRACTS RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTANGIBLES
The Code's definitions of accounts, contract rights and general
intangibles bear careful consideration in the oil and gas context.
Section 9-106 states:
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased
or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper. "Contract right" means any rights to payment under
a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper. "General intangibles" means any per-
sonal property (including things in action) other than goods,
accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents, and instruments.
Section 9-103, dealing with conflict of laws, provides that filing
as to accounts or contract rights is governed by the law of the state
in which the assignor has located the office which keeps the records
concerning such accounts or contract rights."0 On the other hand,
filing as to general intangibles is governed by the law of the state
where the debtor's chief place of business is located."' Because of this
filing distinction, it is vital that the nature of the collateral be ac-
curately analyzed in each financing transaction to assure that an
effectual Code filing in the proper state will be accomplished.
Where a filing is made as to accounts or contract rights, the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the state where the assignor's
records are kept will control. Section 9-103 is, of course, the relevant
conflict of laws rule for all states which have adopted the Code.
However, if the assignor's records are kept in a non-Code state, such
as Delaware, complications will arise. The conflict of laws rule of the
non-Code state may require that the assignee file in the state where
5 9 Another problem arises with respect to oil and gas equipment moved from state to
state. In such cases (assuming that all states involved have adopted the Code), filing
in the first state will be effective in the second state for four months after the equip-
ment is moved to the second state. Section 9-103(3). If filing is accomplished in the
second state within the four month period, perfection of the security interest relates
back to the first filing; if filing in the second state is accomplished after the four
month period, perfection dates from filing in the second state. Where oil and gas
equipment is transported across state lines, the lender should, therefore, file timely
financing statements in the adjoining state, as well as in Colorado.
0 Section 9-103 (1). The Code gives no definition of "records."
61 Section 9-103'(2). The term "debtor," as used in § 9-103(2), means the owner of the
collateral subject to the security interest and should not be confused with the term
'account debtor." See §§ 9-105(a) and (d).
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the oil is produced or where the records of the oil purchaser are kept.
Thus, troublesome multiple filings may be necessary in one or more
states unrelated to the loan transaction.
Another problem may arise where oil and gas in place is com-
mitted to a purchase contract prior to extraction. This will nearly
always be the case where production of natural gas is involved.
In such a case, the lender may never have acquired a security interest
in severed hydrocarbons; instead, the lender's security interest intitally
may have attached to "contract rights" which ripened into "accounts"
upon delivery of the extracted hydrocarbons to the production pur-
chaser at the wellhead. In this respect the contract rights, as independ-
ent collateral, may be subject to the special filing provisions of
Section 9-103, instead of the filing provisions of Sections 9-401 and
9-306, which apply to contracts rights as mere proceeds of the ex-
tracted hydrocarbons. " Thus, if the record keeping office of the
debtor is located outside of Colorado, it is advisable for the lender
to file in both states.
An anomalous situation may also result from the Code dis-
tinction between "contract right" and "general intangible." A
purchase contract, viewed from the seller's standpoint, creates a
right to receive payment for hydrocarbon substances delivered to the
purchaser. This is a "contract right" which matures into an "account"
upon performance by the seller.6" But from the purchaser's stand joint
the contract creates a right to receive goods and is therefore classified
as a "general intangible.''" Where a financing transaction involves
a pipeline or processing company as a debtor this distinction is vital.
It is common practice in such situations to include as part of the
62 If the contract rights or accounts were construed as mere "proceeds" of the hydro-
carbons, the proper place of filing would be with the Colorado Secretary of State,
because the primary collateral is the "goods." Section 9-306(2).
Another problem concerning proceeds, accounts and contract rights may arise
under § 9-306(3), which provides that a security interest in proceeds relates back to
the time of perfection of the security interest in the collateral which gave rise to the
proceeds. This provision was intended, among other things, to alleviate any question
of voidable preference in bankruptcy where the proceeds were obtained within the four
month period but the security interest in the collateral was perfected prior thereto.
Unfortunately, this provision may confuse the priority of competing security interests
in contract rights, accounts and proceeds. Where hydrocarbons in place are covered
by a purchase contract prior to extraction, as in the case of a gas purchase contract,
the collateral may never take the form of "goods" (extracted hydrocarbons). Instead,
the collateral may constitute "contract rights" (before extraction) and "accounts"
(after extraction). If Lender A files as to extracted hydrocarbons, accounts and pro-
ceeds, and Lender B subsequently files as to contract rights, accounts and proceeds,
which party has priority as to proceeds? Lender B may argue that his perfected inter-
est in proceeds relates back to his perfected interest in contract rights under § 9-106,
which indicates that a contract right necessarily exists prior to the account which arises
from performance of the contract. To avoid any such controversy, Lender A should
have filed as to contract rights as well as extracted hydrocarbons, accounts and proceeds.
63 Section 9-106 provides that a "contract right" is limited to rights to "payment."
64 Section 9-106.
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mortgaged property all of the debtor's purchase and sales contracts
in addition to the physical assets. If the record keeping office and
chief place of business of the debtor are in different states, care must
be taken to comply with the filing laws of the applicable jurisdictions.
Moreover, the lender's problem is unfortunately accentuated by
the Code's use of the phrase "chief place of business." The great
body of case law dealing with this legal concept has not resolved it
to the satisfaction of the security needs of the lender. Indeed, multiple
filings as to general intangibles may be necessary to cover adequately
all jurisdictions in which the debtor conducts business, at least when
the debtor's business activities are substantial enough to raise a ques-
tion that any one or more of such states may be deemed to be his
"chief place of business.""5
VI. VOIDABLE PREFERENCE
An important question may arise under bankruptcy law as to
whether extracted hydrocarbons applied toward satisfaction of
mortgage indebtedness constitute a transfer to the creditor on ac-
count of an antecedent indebtedness within the "voidable preference"
section of the Bankruptcy Act.' The problem stems from Code
provisions related to perfection of security interests in after-acquired
property. A security interest cannot attach until the debtor has rights
in the collateral, and the Code specifically provides that the debtor
has no rights in oil and gas until they are extracted. 7 Because one
of the requirements for perfection of a security interest is that it
must attach to the collateral, it follows that the lender's security
interest is extracted hydrocarbons can never be perfected under the
Code prior to the moment of extraction. Although a financing state-
ment covering proceeds of production may be filed prior to develop-
ment of the leasehold, the lender nevertheless faces attack by the
trustee in bankruptcy as to the proceeds attributable to each unit of
oil and gas extracted within four months of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. Provided that all other elements of a voidable pre-
ference are present, the trustee in bankruptcy may assert that delayed
perfection rendered the transaction a transfer to secure an antecedent
debt.
Section 9-108 of the Code anticipates this problem and provides
that the lender's "security interest in the after-acquired collateral
65 For a general discussion of problems of terminology involved in choosing where to
file under the Code, see Coogan and Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial
Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems,
76 HARv. L. REv. 1529, 1539 (1963).
66 Section 60(a) ; 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958).
67 Section 9-204(2) (b).
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shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for
an antecedent debt." (Emphasis added.) There can be no mistake
that the Code draftsmen clearly intended to eliminate the voidable
preference threat to after-acquired property by virtue of Section
9-108." However, a serious question is presented whether such a
provision of state law could subordinate federal bankruptcy law."
An answer to the lender's security needs in this context must
be sought not in the ritualistic language of Section 9-108, but rather
from a careful analysis of the nature of a security interest in hydro-
carbons prior to, as well as after, extraction. If an interest in oil and
gas in place is an interest in real estate subject to the real estate
recording laws, it follows that proper recording of the mortgage in
the real estate records would perfect the lender's lien as to oil and
gas in place. If the lender concurrently filed a financing statement
under the Code as to extracted hydrocarbons, contract rights, ac-
counts and proceeds, and such recording and filing was completed
over four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act should offer no obstacle to the
lender. Section 60(a) (2) provides the following test as to when a
"transfer" of property of the bankrupt occurs:
[A] transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed
to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far
perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become
superior to the rights of the transferee. A transfer of real property
shall be deemed to have been made or suffered when it became so
for perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchaser from the debtor
could create rights in such property superior to the rights of the
transferee.
If real estate recording and Code filing were accomplished over
four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the
lender's interest in the oil and gas in place is invulnerable to attack
by a subsequent bona fide purchaser. Moreover, the lender's security
interest in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds is also invulnerable
to attack by a lien creditor at any time subsequent to the moment of
extraction of the hydrocarbons. Thus, the lender could assert that
his security interest was continuously perfected from the moment
of recordation of the real estate mortgage, nothwithstanding the
metamorphosis which the collateral underwent upon extraction
6 See Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property
Clauses under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 194 (1959).
5 The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution poses a formidable obstacle
to the realization of the objectives of § 9-108, which may conflict with § 60(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, § 60.51 A (7.2) (1964). See In re
Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 4 C.C.H. INSTAL. CREDIT GUIDE f 98483 (Ore.
1966) (discussed in Editor's Note; supra).
VOL. 43
OIL AND GAS FINANCING
according to the traditional law of realty and personalty. A forceful
analogy can be drawn from the cases which hold that substitution
of new security for old security does not ordinarily create a preference
because there is no resultant diminution of the debtor's estate to the
injury of other creditors.70
The difficulty with this analysis is that, although an interest in
unextracted hydrocarbons may be an interest in real estate for
recording purposes, the debtor does not acquire rights in oil and
gas, as personalty, until extraction. Conceptually, at the moment of
extraction there is an instantaneous change in the nature of the
collateral from realty to personalty and a correlative "transfer" to the
creditor. As a practical matter, the oil extracted is much more valuable
than the oil in place. Because a time-gap is created between the loan
and the "transfer," the danger of a voidable preference is substantial.
Moreover, if the lender takes only a naked assignment of proceeds
of production without an accompanying real estate mortgage on the
leasehold itself, the danger of a voidable preference is greatly
increased. In such case the lender cannot refer to an earlier recording
date for purposes of establishing a continuous perfection which
antedates the four month preference period.
The oil and gas lender should also be wary of another pitfall
pertaining to bankruptcy proceedings. If the lender records the
mortgage in the real property records and files a Code financing
statement which merely covers proceeds of production rather than
extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, the trustee in bankruptcy may
argue that a gap in perfection of the security interest exists between
the moment of extraction and the birth of proceeds upon sale of the
hydrocarbons. This argument would be particularly persuasive with
respect to oil held in storage tanks on the leasehold before delivery
to the purchaser. The existence of the "gap" period would fortify
the trustee's argument that the "transfer" contemplated by Section
60(a) (2) occurred at the time when the proceeds came into exist-
ence, and that a lien creditor levying during the "gap" period (which
was only scintilla juris) could have obtained priority over the bank.
To avoid this trap, the lender should always file a financing state-
ment which covers extracted hydrocarbons, contract rights, accounts
and proceeds.
The danger of voidable preference is also increased if the lender
70 Stewart v. Platt, 101 U.S. 731 (1879); Cook v. Tullis, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 332 (1874);
Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roach, 186 F.2d 827, 831 (1st Cir. 1951) (dictum); 3
COLLIER, id., § 60.20.
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waits to file a Code financing statement covering extracted hydro-
carbons and proceeds until some time after recording the real estate
mortgage but before production is actually obtained. 1 This would
allow the trustee to argue that the lender had not done everything
possible to obtain immediate and continuous perfection and that
such tardiness should make the court favor more the formalistic
preference argument set forth above. With this possibility in mind,
the lender would be well advised to record immediately as to realty
and to file immediately under the Code as to extracted hydrocarbons
and proceeds.
Even if the above-described pitfalls are avoided, until the pre-
ference problem is resolved by decisional law the lender must face
the possibility that four months of production attributable to the
interest of the debtor may be lost to the trustee in bankruptcy despite
the lender's full compliance with all applicable recording and filing
provisions. The lender may take some small consolation in the fact
that oil and gas in place at the time of filing of the petition in
bankruptcy will be covered by the perfected lien of the real estate
mortgage, and thus, proceeds of production accruing after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy will not be subject to the grasp of the
trustee under the preference provision?2
VII. THE STATUTORY LIEN
The relationship between statutory liens and Article 9 will also
be of concern to Code lenders dealing with oil and gas. A statutory
lien upon oil and gas in place or fixtures will be governed by the
rules applicable to real estate transactions, but the Code will come
into play when extracted hydrocarbons or other types of personalty
are covered by a statutory lien.
The Colorado statute which grants a lien against oil and gas
properties for labor or materials supplied in the development and
operation of the leasehold 3 creates a number of problems if such
lien is sought to be applied to personalty situated on the leasehold
or to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds. If the statutory lien claim-
71 This situation may arise where a loan is made to finance the development of an un-
proven leasehold. National banking associations, however, are not ordinarily author-
ized to take the unproven leasehold as collateral for such a loan. 55 Stat. 62 (1941),
12 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
72 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 69, § 60.32.
73 COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-1 (1963) provides:
Every person, firm or corporation, whether as contractor, subcontractor,
materialman, or laborer, who perOrms labor upon or furnishes machinery,
material, fuel, explosives, power or supplies for sinking, repairing, altering
or operating any gas well, oil well or other well, or for constructing, repair-
ing or operating any oil derrick, oil tank, oil pipeline or water pipeline, pump
VOL. 43
OIL AND GAS FINANCING
ant files a lien statement within the six month filing period7' and
commences a suit to foreclose the lien within six months after the
date of filing the statement,5 the priority of the statutory lien is
regulated by Section 86-5-3 of the 1963 Colorado Revised Statutes,
which provides:
No chattel mortgage shall be valid as against any person,
firm or corporation entitled to a lien under the provisions of this
article; provided, that no mortgage, lien or other incumbrance
existing and recorded as provided by law at the time of the inception
of the lien herein provided for shall be affected thereby. (Emphasis
added.)
Because the statutory lien may relate back to the first item of
material furnished or labor performed, or the commencement of
work, and because the six month filing period runs from the date
of the last item, it is possible that a lien statement may be filed well
over six months after the inception of the statutory lien. During the
interval period, security interests in the same collateral may be per-
fected under the Code, thereby creating a question as to the priority
to be accorded the conflicting security interests. At first impression,
Section 9-310 appears to resolve the conflict in favor of the lien
claimant. As adopted in a modified form in Colorado, that section
states:
When a person in the ordinary course of business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given
by statute or rule of law for such materials or services does not
take priority over a perfected security interest unless a statute ex-
pressly provides otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
76
or pumping station, transportation or communication line, gasoline plant or
refinery, by virtue of a contract express or implied, with the owner or lessee
of any interest in real estate, or with the trustee, agent or receiver of any
such owner, part owner or lessee, shall have a lien to secure the payment
thereof upon the properties mentioned, belonging to the party or parties
contracting with the lien claimants, and upon the machinery, materials and
supplies so furnished, and upon any well upon and in which such machinery,
materials and supplies shall have been placed and used, and upon all other
wells, buildings and appurtenances, and the interest, leasehold or otherwise,
of such owner, part owner or lessee in the lot or land upon which said im-
provements are located, or to which they may be removed, to the extent of
the right, title and interest of the owner, part owner or lessee, at the time the
work was commenced or machinery, materials and supplies were begun to be
furnished by the lien claimant or by the contractor under the original con-
tract; and such lien shall extend to any subsequently acquired interest of any
such owner, part owner or lessee. (Emphasis added.)
It is also possible for the lien claimant to proceed under the provisions of the
General Mechanics' Lien Law, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 86-3-1 to -24 (1963). However,
the provisions pertaining to the specific statutory lien on wells and equipment allow
for a lengthier filing period (six months) than the provisions of the General Me-
chanics' Lien Law (three months). In either case, it is assumed for purposes of the
discussion to follow that the statutory lien claimant has elected to proceed under COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 86-5-1 to-li (1963).
74 COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-4 (1963).
7 5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-5 (1963).
76 COLO. REV. STAT. § 155-9-310 (1963).
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It should be noted that the Colorado version of Section 9-310
differs from the Official Text versionj which grants priority to the
statutory lien unless the statute expressly provides otherwise. Al-
though the presumption of priority has been reversed in the Colorado
version, the lien claimant may argue that section 86-5-3 of the 1963
Colorado Revised Statutes does "expressly provide otherwise" by
subordinating "chattel mortgages" perfected after inception of the
statutory lien.77
One of the requirements of Section 9-310 is that the lien claim-
ant have the goods in his possession. This requirement severely limits
the applicability of Section 9-310 to the statutory lien on oil and gas
properties, as most claimants of this type of lien would not ordinarily
meet the possessory requirement."
On the other hand, the operator of the leasehold probably is in
possession within the meaning of Section 9-310 as to the personalty
located on the leasehold and the oil in the tanks.". Because this pro-
7 For an interpretation that a lien statute referring to the priority of a "mortgage" is
inapplicable to the priority of a Code "security interest" within the meaning of § 9-310,
see Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964). Such a formalistic
view, if adopted in Colorado, would emasculate CoLo. Rv. STAT. § 86-5-3 (1963),
which expressly subordinates a "chattel mortgage" but not a "security interest."
78 Assertion of a non-possessory statutory lien in bankruptcy proceedings against the
debtor may raise a problem which is commonly referred to as the doctrine of "circu-
larity." Section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "statutory liens on per-
sonal property not accompanied by possession of such property... shall be postponed
in payment" to expenses of administration and wage claims. 66 Stat. 427 (1952),
11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1966). Although the operator of oil and gas properties may be
in possession within the meaning of § 67(c), laborers or materialmen would not be.
Thus, assertion of a laborer's or materialman's statutory lien in bankruptcy proceedings
against the debtor would bring § 67(c) into play. Because proceeds would not ordi-
narily be in the possession of the operator, laborer or materialman, assertion of a statu-
tory lien as to proceeds [if allowed by COLO. REv. STAT. § 86-5-1 (1963)] would
also invoke § 67(c). The following circularity problem might then ensue:
1) The statutory lien would be superior to the mortgage under Colorado law.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 86-5-3 (1963).
2) Administrative expenses and wage claims would be superior to the statu-
tory lien under bankruptcy law. 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)
(1966).
3) The mortgage would be superior to administrative expenses and wage
claims under bankruptcy law. 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 69, § 57.07.
Where the statutory lien is superior to the mortgage but inferior to the priority
claims, the courts have resolved the circularity by also subordinating the mortgage to
the priority claims. In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1956) ; In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959).
Under this hierarchy, the order of payment out of the bankrupt debtor's estate becomes:
1) Administrative expenses and wage claims.
2) Statutory lien.
3) Mortgage.
If the priority claims are substantial, the mortgagee's security interest may be
seriously affected by the circularity which will ensue where a relatively small lien
claim is asserted in a bankruptcy proceeding. For a view that § 67(c) is inapplicable
to the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy see California State Dept. of Employ-
ment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 '(9th Cir. 1954) ; New Orleans v. Harrell, 134
F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943); In re American Zyloptic CO., Inc., 181 F. SupP. 77
(E.D.N.Y. 1960).
Furthermore, the operator would appear to be performing "services" in the ordinary
course of his business. See the Comment to § 9-310.
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vision of the Code respects priority expressly accorded by the statute
creating the lien, the operator may claim a statutory lien (independ-
ent of any contractual operator's lien)"° perfected as of the date of
commencement of operations on the leasehold.81 Therefore, as against
a Code security interest perfected after the commencement of work,
the operator may claim statutory lien priority under section 86-5-3.
Even if the lender perfects a security interest prior to com-
mencement of operations, a possibility exists that the security interest
may be subordinated to the statutory lien if the statutory lien extends
to severed hydrocarbons and proceeds. Because the statutory lien
contains a provision regulating its priority as against a chattel
mortgage, extracted hydrocarbons, as chattels, and the proceeds
thereof arguably are subject to the statutory lien. Although the
statute does not expressly state that extracted hydrocarbons and
proceeds are subject to the lien granted, the statute does mention "the
interest, leasehold or otherwise, of such owner, part owner or lessee"
and further provides that the lien granted "shall extend to any sub-
sequently acquired interest of any such owner, part owner or lessee.'"
In other states, similar statutory liens upon oil and gas properties
have been held not to attach to extracted hydrocarbons or proceeds
where the statutes involved did not expressly so provide." Although
such statutes referred to the leasehold interest, they did not contain
a reference to "any subsequently acquired interest."" Whether, under
the Colorado statute, the concept of "subsequently acquired inter-
est" includes extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds will remain the
subject of speculation until the point is litigated or otherwise resolved
by legislative amendment."
80 The operator will receive the greatest protection, not by relying on his statutory lien,
but by including a lien provision in the operating agreement. Because the contractual
lien covers extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, the operating agreement is subject
to the filing requirements of Article 9. See § 9-102 (1) (a). The operating agreement,
therefore, should conform to the requirements of a Code security agreement and be
filed in the Secretary of State's office as well as in the real property records. In the
alternative, the operator may file a financing statement. If such filing is delayed or
omitted, the operator could presumably still rely on the statutory lien, subject to the
assumption that such lien extends to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds.
81 In Colorado, there is strong authority for relation back to the date of initial leasehold
operations. See Park Lane Properties, Inc. v. Fisher, 89 Colo. 591, 5 P.2d 577 (1939),
where, under the general mechanics' lien statute, commencement of work was deemed
to relate back to the planning stage prior to initial construction of the building.
82 COLO. REv. STAT. § 86-5-1 (1963) (Emphasis added.).
8 Tarheel Drilling & Equip. Co. v. Valley Steel Prods. Co., 231 Ark. 510, 330 S.W.2d
717 (1960) ; Stanolind Crude Oil Purchasing Co. v. Busey, 185 Okla. 200, 9 P.2d 876
(1939); Gary v. Rufus Lillard Co., 196 Okla. 421, 165 P.2d 344 (1946).
84 The Nebraska statute expressly extends the lien to oil and gas produced from the lease,
and the proceeds thereof. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-803 (3) (Reissue 1960).
85 See generally, Rodden, The Bankruptcy Act and the Independent Producer, 9 RocKY
MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 337 (1964).
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Assuming, however, that the statutory lien does apply to ex-
tracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, a troublesome question of
priority is presented. The lender who has properly perfected his
security interest in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds under Sec-
tion 9-306 may find the collateral pumped out from under his
mortgage and into the hands of the statutory lien claimant. This is
because the lender's security interest in extracted hydrocarbons can-
not attach until the moment of extraction," while the statutory lien
can relate back to a point in time prior to extraction. In other words,
Section 9-204(2) (b) makes it impossible for any "mortgage, lien or
other encumbrance" on the extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds to
"exist" before "the inception" of the statutory lien, within the mean-
ing of section 86-5-3. Therefore, if the leasehold operator has pos-
session of extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, he may claim a
statutory lien with priority over a previously perfected Code security
interest. 7 .
A counter-argument, similar to that raised in the voidable pre-
ference context, is applicable where a real estate mortgage en-
cumbers the leasehold prior to commencement of operations. The
argument is that the lender's interest in extracted hydrocarbons relates
back to the recording of the real estate mortgage and establishes a
continuous perfection. Moreover, the lender, by recording and Code
filing has utilized all available means of perfection. Such diligence
is all that section 86-5-3 asks as a condition of priority. Therefore,
the lender's security interest in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds
should not be treated as a "chattel mortgage" interest within the
meaning of the statute, but rather as a real estate mortgage interest.
Whether this argument will be accepted by the courts in light of
Section 9-204(2) (b) can only be open to conjecture."
86 Section 9-204(2) (b).
87 If the operator does not have possession of the runs the same priority problem is pre-
sented. The only difference is that § 9-310 is not involved, and priority turns solely
upon the construction of § 9-204(2) (b) in relation to COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-3
(1963).
88 Extension of the statutory lien to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds presents a
serious problem for the production purchaser in Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-7
(1963) provides that the transferee of property subject to the statutory lien takes
subject to the lienor's rights, regardless of lack of notice. This result is in direct
opposition to § 9-307 of the Code, which allows production purchasers in the ordinary
course to take free of any "security interest" in the oil and gas. However, § 9-102(2)
provides that Article 9 does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in § 9-310.
Therefore § 9-307 is of no avail to the production purchaser if a non-possessory
statutory lien is involved. But if the operator asserts a contractual lien, it is arguable
that the Code comes back into play to preempt CoLo. REv. STAT. § 86-5-7 (1963) as
"inconsistent." See §§ 9-102(1)(a) and 10-103.
In contrast, the Nebraska operator's lien statute contains provision similar to
§ 9-307 of the Code, which protects buyers in ordinary course from the operator's lien.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-806 (1960); Young, The Nebraska Oil and Gas Lien, 41
NEB. L. REV. 572, 579 (1962).
VOL. 43
OIL AND GAS FINANCING
VIII. FEDERAL TAX LIENS
The after-acquired nature of extracted hydrocarbons and pro-
ceeds may create problems concerning priority of federal tax liens.
To be considered "choate" as against a federal tax lien, a security
interest must be specific and definite in the following respects:
(1) identity of the lienholder, (2) amount of the lien, and (3)
property subject to the lien."
If a lender files a financing statement which covers extracted
hydrocarbons, accounts and proceeds and a federal tax lien is sub-
sequently filed against the debtor, does the lender have a "choate"
lien upon production which accrues after the filing of the tax lien?
A recent bankruptcy case9" suggests that a perfected Code security
interest in unaccrued accounts is inchoate. In that case, accounts
representing the proceeds of contracts not in existence at the time
of filing of the tax lien were held to be indefinite and the assign-
ment of accounts was therefore subordinated to the tax lien.
However, the bankruptcy case involved accounts arising under
contracts for ship repair services rendered by the debtor. An im-
portant distinction as to the nature of the accounts can be made
with respect to a security interest in extracted hydrocarbons and
proceeds. As to oil and gas in place, a properly recorded mortgage
is choate vis-a-vis a subsequently filed federal tax lien. Where the
lender both records his mortgage as a real estate mortgage and files
under the Code as to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, a force-
ful argument may be made that the lien, once choate, is not rendered
inchoate by transformation of the collateral from realty to per-
sonalty upon extraction.
This argument is fortified by Elliott v. Sioux Oil Co. 1 The
Elliott case involved an assignment of proceeds of oil and gas pro-
duction. The assignment was recorded in the real estate records of
the county prior to the filing of a tax lien against the assignor. It
should be noted that the assignee did not take a formal mortgage of
the leasehold estate. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the assign-
ment was executed as security for a debt and, thus, constituted a
mortgage. Because the subject of the -mortgage" was minerals to
be extracted, the court held that the assignment affected real estate
and was subject to the rules of perfection of liens upon real estate.
Prior recordation of the assignment in the real estate records per-
89 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
90 In re Hudon & Son, Inc., 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9517 (D. Mass. 196-1 ).
91 191 F. Supp. 847 (D. Wyo. 1960).
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fected the lien and eliminated any question as to specificity of pro-
ceeds which accrued after filing of the tax lien.
Although the Elliott case did not involve the Code, the reason-
ing of the court would appear to be equally applicable to Code
security interests in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds. However,
due to the fugacious nature of hydrocarbons, the lender can never
be certain that his collateral will be realized until the moment of
extraction. This uncertainty, coupled with the Code rules for per-
fection as to extracted minerals, will continue to be a risk to the oil
and gas lender with respect to competing federal tax liens.
IX. FIXTURES
In oil and gas financing security interests in fixtures are par-
ticularly important, because often much of the collateral involved is
attached to the land in some way. Tanks, casing, pipelines, and
residences for field personnel on the leasehold are among the most
recurrent examples. Given this fact, the oil and gas financer, under
the typical production or development loan, will be dealing con-
stantly with Section 9-313 of the Code, which governs priorities
among conflicting security interests in fixtures.
In the oil and gas context, the conflict will typically be between
the bank generally financing development of the leasehold (Bank
"D"), and the bank financing the purchase of equipment likely to
become fixtures (Bank "P"). More specifically, the conflict will be
between Bank D's mortgage on real estate and personalty, which
mortgage contains an after-acquired property clause, and Bank P's
purchase money security interest 2 in the equipment to be affixed to
the leasehold. Bank P will seek to preserve its purchase money
security interest in the equipment to avoid feeding the after-acquired
property clause in Bank D's mortgage. 3
Section 9-313(1) of the Code will probably not be relevant
to ordinary oil and gas financing. That section provides:
The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into
a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass,
metal work and the like and no security interest in them exists
under this Article unless the structure remains personal property
under applicable law.
Apparently, such incorporated materials become part of the
a Section 9-107 provides a definition of this term.
93 For a discussion of this general situation, see Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority,
76 HARv. L. Rav. 1333, 1388-1398 (1963). Two subsidiary points should be men-
tioned. First, if the debtor owns the equipment outright, there will be no conflict and
Bank D's collateral will be increased by the amount of the value of the equipment,
whether it is after-acquired or not. But if the debtor has merely leased the equipment,
Bank D's security interest cannot rise above the debtor's interest as lessee.
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realty subject to real estate recording laws. It is possible to conceive
of items such as well casing in place and buried pipelines as "metal
work.., incorporated into a structure" in a manner similar to "lum-
ber, bricks, tile," etc." However, it is difficult to imagine a situation
in which other types of equipment would be so incorporated into
the leasehold. Equipment such as tanks, pumps, surface pipelines
and related machinery used in oil and gas operations are only
temporarily affixed to the land. Therefore, Section 9-313(1) ap-
pears to be inapplicable to such temporarily affixed equipment.
The other parts of Section 9-313 are, however, very relevant to
oil and gas financing. The section provides a system of priorities
among conflicting security interests in "fixtures," the definition of
"fixtures" being left to state (Colorado) law. Section 9-313(1) also
provides:
This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fix-
tures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
Probably the most important provisions are Section 9-313(2) and
(4), which state in part:
A security interest which attaches to goods before they become
fixtures takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons
who have an interest in the real estate except [subsequent transferees
of any interest in the real estate, a creditor subsequently levying on
the realty or a prior mortgage of the realty making subsequent ad-
vances, if the subsequent transfer, levy or advance is made without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.]
Thus, if Bank P's purchase money security interest in the equip-
ment "attaches" before the equipment is affixed to the leasehold,
Bank P has priority to the equipment over Bank D, even if Bank P
never files or records its interest in the chattel or realty records. This
assumes, however, that Bank D executes its mortgage on the debtor's
interest before the "attachment" of the purchase money security
interest of Bank P, and that Bank D does not make "subsequent
advances." If the purchase money interest predates the develop-
ment loan, then Bank P is required under Section 9-313(4) to
94If well casing in place and buried pipelines are "structures" within the meaning of
§ 9-313 (1), the Code rules of priority will not apply unless such items remain "per-
sonal property" under Colorado law. This subsection emphasizes the manner of affixa-
tion of the completed structure as the sole criterion to determine whether the structure
and all of its integral parts constitute realty or personalty. However, "the applicable
law" of Colorado, as discussed in detail in the text immediately following, emphasizes
other criteria to determine the same question.
One of the traditional tests by which to classify property as a fixture of personalty
is whether the property may be removed "without material injury to the freehold."
This concept is completely abandoned by the Code, which requires only that the secured
party who removes the collateral from the real estate reimburse any encumbrancer or
owner of the real estate (other than the debtor) for any physical injury caused by the
removal. See § 9-313(5).
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file in the county where the fixtures are located" with a description
of the relevant land in order to obtain priority over Bank D.
The difficulty with this analysis is that Section 9-313 only
applies to "fixtures" as that term is defined by state law, and in
Colorado there is a serious question (1) what a fixture is and (2)
whether such a category - halfway between personalty and realty -
exists at all as a separate category subject to priorities under the
recording laws.
The general rule which appears to have emerged from the lead-
ing Colorado fixtures cases is that property must be either personalty
or realty; although "fixtures" constitute a recognized category as a
matter of property law, there is no intermediate category of "fix-
tures" insofar as recording priority is concerned. If a chattel mortgage
is executed before physical annexation of the property, the property
remains "personalty" free from any prior or subsequent real estate
mortgage; if execution occurs after annexation, the chattel mortgage
is subordinate to a prior real estate mortgage. 7
Against this background of case law in Colorado it is possible
that "fixtures," as an independent category of collateral under the
recording laws, may not now exist. If Colorado eventually recognizes
"fixtures," apart from realty or personalty, to accommodate state
law to the structure of Section 9-313, then presumably the priorities
of that section will govern conflicting security interests in items such
as well casing, rigs, pipelines and the like. However, in the light
of prior cases, it appears unlikely that the parties will create "fixtures"
by so labeling such property in a security agreement. It is more likely
under the Code, as adopted in Colorado, that oil and gas equipment
will constitute either personalty or realty, depending solely upon
whether the chattel security interest attached before or after affixa-
tion of the equipment to the leasehold.
This uncertainty could create a difficult filing problem for
Bank P. If oil and gas equipment is financed by conditional sale
before its affixation, a Colorado court might well term the equip-
ment "personalty." As personalty, the equipment would no longer
be within the scope of Section 9-313, which deals only with "fixtures."
Rather, the filing rules applicable to "equipment" would apply,
95 Section 9-401 (1) (b). Fixture filings must be cross-indexed from the local personalty
records to the local realty records. Section 9-401 (5).
96 Section 9-402 (1).
97 See Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Sylvester, 65 Colo. 569, 179 Pac. 154 (1919) ; Razatos
v. Daniels & Fisher Stores Co., 110 Colo. 105, 131, P.2d 417 '1942); Stapp v. Car
Ice Corp., 122 Colo. 526, 224 P.2d 935 (1950); STORKE & SEARS, COLORADO SI:-
CUiThy LAW, § 24 (1955) ; Comment, Colorado Fixtures Law, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
458 (1962) ; Coogan, Security Interests In Fixtures under The Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1319, 1343-1349 (1962). Clark, supra note 38 at 111-14.
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namely, central filing." If Bank P erroneously files as to "fixtures"
in the county, when in fact the goods constitute "equipment," Bank
D will prevail by virtue of its prior central filing (and the after-
acquired property clause contained in Bank D's security agreement).
The only safe course for the purchase money lender is dual filing,
locally in the county where the property is first affixed, and centrally
with the Secretary of State as to "equipment."" If the debtor uses
property which will be moved from leasehold to leasehold, Bank P,
to be protected as to "fixtures," need only file in the county where
the property is first affixed."
On the other hand, the collateral value of salvaged property is
threatened by the local filing rules of the Code as to fixtures. If the
property initially became a "fixture" prior to removal to another
county and Bank P properly filed in the county where the property
was first affixed, then neither Bank D nor any subsequent lender
can safely assume that the salvaged property is unencumbered until
the records of every Colorado county have been searched. To be
safe, Bank P should have filed centrally as to "equipment," as well as
locally as to "fixtures." Such central filing would have put Bank D
and any subsequent chattel mortgagees on notice of the security
interest without the inconvenience of local record searches. However,
to the extent that Bank P was satisfied that it had a security interest
in "fixtures" and chose to file only locally, Bank D and subsequent
mortgagees are faced with a multi-county record search.
The uncertainty of the law concerning "fixtures" in Colorado
dictates multiple Code filings by the conditional seller of oil and
gas equipment and multiple searches by any subsequent lender
interested in salvaged property as loan collateral. Until Section
9-313 is amended or Colorado law pertaining to "fixtures" is clari-
fied, confusion is apt to reign in this area of oil and gas financing
under the Code.
X. TRANSMITTING UTILITY
Colorado has included a special provision in Article 9 applicable
to pipeline companies as well as to other public utilities. The section
will somewhat lessen the burden of financers of pipeline companies
98Sections 9-312(4), 9-401. If P has a purchase money security interest within the
meaning of § 9-107, then § 9-312(4) allows an extra ten days within which to file
centrally as to "equipment." The ten day period runs from the date that the debtor
receives possession of the collateral.
99Colorado has added § 9-401(5) to the Code. That section requires fixtures to be
cross-indexed from the county personalty records to the county realty records. Such
cross-indexing is inadequate, however, if only personally is involved. In such case,
only central filing with the Secretary of State is adequate.
100 Section 9-401 ( 3 ).
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m Colorado.1 0 1 This new section provides that a lender making loans
to a "transmitting utility" on the security of pipelines and other equip-
ment will be spared the necessity of filing financing statements in
every county through which the pipelines extend - even if the collat-
eral constitutes "fixtures."0 2 Furthermore, no continuation statements
will be necessary on a long-term loan and no description of the real
estate is necessary as to "fixtures."
The definition of "transmitting utility" in Section 9-408 turns
on whether the debtor conducts business "pursuant to the rights or
franchises issued by a state or federal regulatory body." Certificates
of public convenience and necessity are the most obvious examples
of such "rights or franchises," but other types of governmental
regulation may also bring the section into operation. If a carrier
were exempted from state regulation as to isolated and private intra-
state sales of gas, the section would presumably still apply if any
other part of the company's activities were regulated by any other
state or by the Federal Power Commission as to interstate activity."'
In addition, any company which falls within the definition of "public
utility" as defined by Colorado statute'" would also appear to come
within the scope of Section 9-408. Thus, pipeline companies making
only selected sales to private consumers in Colorado may not be able
to avail themselves of the benefits of Section 9-408. The same may
also be true of pipeline companies making surplus sales to munici-
palities for resale to the general public."' 5
To be safe, the lender should first ascertain whether the debtor
has obtained certificates of convenience and necessity from any state
or the Federal Power Commission or whether proceedings exempting
the debtor from regulation have taken place. If a certificate has
101 Section 9-408 provides in part:
Transmitting Utility ... the proper place to file in order to perfect a security
interest in goods of a transmitting utility shall be in the office of the secretary
of state. When the financing statement covers goods of a transmitting utility
which are or are to become fixtures, no description of the real estate con-
cerned is required. The words 'transmitting utility' mean any corporation or
other business entity primarily engaged, pursuant to the rights or franchises
issued by a state or federal regulatory body, in the .. .transmission or dis-
tribution of oil, gas, or petroleum products . . .a security interest in goods
of a transmitting utility perfected as provided above shall continue in effect
in accordance with the terms of the security agreement without the neces-
sity of filing continuation statements.... (Emphasis added.)
102 See §§ 9-401 and 9-402. However, it should be noted that no state adjoining Colorado
has yet adopted a similar provision. Thus, financing an interstate pipeline may require
multiple local filings in adjoining states, even though only one filing is necessary in
Colorado.
103 142 Colo. 361, 351 P.2d 241 (1960). See Public UtIs. Comm'n v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 142 Coio. 36i, 351 P.2d 241 (1960).
104 CoLo REv. STAT. 115-1-3 (1963).
105 See Public UtIs. Comm'n v. Colorado Inter-state Gas Co., 142 Colo. 361, 351 P.2d
241 (1960).
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issued, which will often be the case, then the lending institution may
avail itself of the filing benefits of Section 9-408.
XI. PRODUCTION PAYMENT FINANCING
The code will play a vital part in the financing of production
payments. So long as the leasehold remains undeveloped, the rules
governing priority of security interests in real property are applicable.
It is assumed that in Colorado an unaccrued production payment,
like unaccrued royalty, is an interest in realty subject to the recording
statutes.' However, the hydrocarbons when extracted become per-
sonalty subject to the requirements of Article 9. Therefore, along
with the recording of the real estate mortgage, the lender should also
centrally file a financing statement covering extracted hydrocarbons,
accounts, contract rights and proceeds."'
Although proceeds of production accruing to the production
payment will typically be paid directly to the lender and perfection
may be accomplished by actual possession of proceeds,'01 perfection
of accounts and contract rights may be achieved under the Code only
by filing.!09 Before obtaining possession of the proceeds, the lender
may be viewed as having a security interest only in such accounts and
contract rights. For this reason, filing as to accounts and contract
rights, in addition to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, is advis-
able. Such filing will allow the lien to cover the collateral through all
its transmutations with no intervening gaps. As discussed previously,
duplicate filings may be necessary if the debtor's record keeping office
is located in another state."'
The usual pattern in production payment financing is for the
bank to take an assignment of proceeds of production and to execute
transfer and division orders providing for payment of the specified
cash proceeds directly to the bank until the indebtedness is satisfied."'
While there are business reasons for such payment directly to the
bank (such as prepayment of the note and protection in case of
default), the bank's security interest in the proceeds would not be
100 See the textual discussion supra pp. 4-7.
107 The real estate mortgage can double as a Code security agreement and, if all the formal
requirements are met, be filed in lieu of a financing statement. See § 9-402 ( 1).
108 Section 9-305.
109 Section 9-302. Although it is common practice to include a receivership provision in
the production payment mortgage, such provision may not afford protection against
the claims of intervening creditors as to accounts or contract rights unless a filing is
made as to accounts, contract rights and proceeds.
110 Section 9-103(1).
H See Johnson, Legal Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, NINTH ANNUAL INSTIrUTE ON
OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION, p. 158 (1958).
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
endangered by allowing the debtor to have dominion over them.
Section 9-205 of the Code specifically rejects and repeals the doctrine
of Benedict v. Ratner"' which endangers such a security interest
under pre-Code law.
Payment of proceeds directly to the lender gives the lender an
important added protection under the Code. Sections 9-306(4) (b)
and (c) provide:
In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a
debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds
has a perfected security interest.., in indentifiable cash proceeds
in the form of money [or checks] which is not commingled with
other money or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency
proceedings ....
If the lender allows the debtor to take possession of production
payment proceeds or places such proceeds in the debtor's account and
the proceeds become "commingled," the Code will limit the lender
to recovery of an amount not greater than the amount of proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days prior to institution of in-
solvency proceedings against the debtor."' On the other hand, it is
common practice in production payment financing to provide for
assignment of the proceeds to the lender to amortize the indebted-
ness. Thus, the possibility of commingling is eliminated and the
proceeds are indentifiable at all times. To protect its security interest
in proceeds, the lender should keep each production payment loan
account separate from any other accounts arising out of other loan
transactions involving the same debtor.
CONCLUSION
Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Colorado will
present a number of filing and priority problems for the oil and gas
financer. Problems of transition to Code law will soon face lenders
involved in long-term oil and gas financing transactions entered into
under pre-Code law; Code filing, in addition to Land Office filing,
will be required where personal property security interests in federal
oil and gas leases are involved; the handy "mixed mortgage" record-
ing provision presently applicable to mortgages by corporate debtors
will be repealed, and both recording and Code filing will be re-
quired; Code filing will be necessary as to security interests in
motorized equipment not covered by the Colorado Certificate of
Title Act; filings may have to be made in other states as to accounts
=rnd contract# right-s if schA constitute indeendet cal rather
112 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
113 Section 9-306(4) (d).
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than mere "proceeds" of severed hydrocarbons; and proceeds of
extracted hydrocarbons feeding a production payment or other
mortgage may be claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy as a voidable
preference. In addition, potential priority conflicts remain to be
resolved between the statutory lien on oil and gas properties and
Code security interests; a security interest in extracted hydrocarbons
and proceeds may not be "choate" as against a federal tax lien, due
to the after-acquired nature of such collateral; security interests in
oil and gas equipment will be subject to the uncertainties of Colo-
rado decisional law as to fixtures; questions will arise whether or
not certain debtors are "transmitting utilities" subject to the liberal
filing provisions of Section 9-408; and multi-state filings may be
necessary in production payment financing transactions.
Nevertheless, the adoption of the Code will promote uniformity
concerning the rules for perfection of consensual security interests
in personalty. Although the Code was not drafted with oil and gas
financing foremost in mind, the oil and gas lender may reap the
security benefits intended. A measure of caution, often involving
multiple filings, will reduce risks to a minimum.
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